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Sabine Hossenfelder, a physicist by training, has made herself a name as a prolific blogger, 
criticizing recent developments in theoretical physics, such as the idea of the multiverse, 
supersymmetry, and string theory. She has also argued that the grounds for funding 
successors of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) are weak. In her book Lost in Math she 
channels some of her criticisms. Her focus is on aesthetical motivations for developing 
successors to the standard model in particle physics, and in particular the curious 
property of ‘naturalness’.   
 Philosophers of science are well-aware of non-empirical properties of theories (e.g. 
simplicity and unification) can play a role in scientists’ theory choice. The ‘naturalness’ of 
theories, however, is not yet a property much discussed by philosophers of science as a 
general theory-choice criterion. Hossenfelder describes naturalness as the requirement that 
theories shouldn’t contain too large or too small numbers (14) or “ugly numerical 
coincidences” (ibid.). She also characterizes naturalness as the maxim that “what is 
unlikely to have occurred by chance should be avoided” (91). Violations of naturalness can 
indicate to scientists that deeper explanations are called for. The example repeatedly 
discussed by Hossenfelder is the mass of the Higgs boson, discovered at CERN in the LHC 
in 2012 with much attention from the media. The Higgs mass turned out to be relatively 
small, namely 125 GeV. The smallness of the Higgs mass is not a problem per se: the 
problem is generated by the fact that it ought to be much bigger, given its quantum 
interactions with all the other known particles (adding about 1014 GeV). This can be fixed 
“by hand” by adjusting the so-called bare mass of the Higgs boson in such a way that the 
bare mass cancels out the massive contributions of the quantum corrections and leaves 
behind only the observed Higgs mass. This so-called fine-tuning seems very unlikely to 
happen just by chance. Physicists have therefore been looking for a more “natural” 
solution. 
The best proposal physicists have been able to think of are supersymmetries, which 
postulate “superpartners” for the known particles. These superpartners (a “selectron” for 
the electron, “squarks” for quarks, etc.) would contribute opposite terms to the mass of the 
Higgs boson and thus cancel the effects of the masses of the known particles. If there were 
independent evidence for the superpartners of SUSY, we would have ourselves a good 
explanation of the Higgs mass. Unfortunately, the LHC hasn’t produced such evidence. 
What’s worse, the LHC hasn’t found any superpartners around the actual mass of the 
Higgs boson, which means that there will have to be fine-tuning to produce the Higgs 
mass after all, albeit at three orders of magnitude instead of about fifteen. Hossenfelder 
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argues that it this would be absurd, as the reason why SUSY was introduced in the first 
place was to avoid fine-tuning of the Higgs mass in the (38). Even if evidence for SUSY 
should be found eventually, naturalness seems to have been lost already, at least when 
understood as the complete absence of fine-tuning. Other important reasons to pursue 
SUSY, such as the unification of gauge couplings, Hossenfelder dismisses rather swiftly as 
just aesthetically pleasing and as not necessarily true (84).  
 Hossenfelder probes the concept of naturalness more fundamentally. What reasons 
do we have, she asks, to deem numerical properties of our models unlikely? Hossenfelder 
points out that we need to assume a certain probability distribution. For example, the 
probability of any of the six sides of a die to come up is random only provided that the die 
is regular. If the die is oddly shaped, this may no longer be the case. In physics, 
Hossenfelder argues, we have no reason to assume one or the other probability 
distribution for the parameters described by our theories. In particular, the distribution 
may be far from uniform. We therefore don’t have a good foundation for thinking that the 
unnaturalness of a parameter like the Higgs mass is in need of explanation. In despair, 
Hossenfelder concludes: “I can’t shake the impression that we’re really trying to guess the 
rule God plays by, in order to make sure the laws of nature were chosen fairly […]” (111).  
 Hossenfelder is convinced that all there is to naturalness is aesthetics: it is just a 
“feeling, not fact” (38). Interestingly, many of the physicists she interviewed for her book 
seem to agree with her that naturalness is a matter of aesthetics. And these are not just any 
physicists, but physicists of the statue of Steven Weinberg (who Hossenfelder herself 
considers the “greatest physicist alive”), Frank Wilczek, Gerard t’ Hooft, Nima Arkani-
Hamed, and others. Hossenfelder’s frustration with the replies she gets to her piercing 
questions in these interviews is palpable. She believes that aesthetics simply shouldn’t 
play a role in theory-choice in good science. The fact that it does seem to play such a role 
in physics Hossenfelder blames on detrimental sociological factors (153ff.) and biases 
(226ff). In that sense, her view is very similar to the ones advanced by Peter Woit and Lee 
Smolin in the case of String Theory (the latter of whom she credits for trying to “talk me 
out of writing this book”).  
 I agree with Hossenfelder that if naturalness is just a matter of aesthetics, this 
would be problematic for the objectivity of physics. But is naturalness really just about 
aesthetics? Consider once more the example of the Higgs mass. What is problematic, it 
seems, is that there are no independent, theoretically motivated, reasons within the 
standard model for fixing the bare mass. The only reason for inserting such a big bare 
mass is the desire to accommodate the observed Higgs mass. In other words, the fine-
tuning of the Higgs mass is ad hoc. This has little to do with aesthetics; it’s just bad 
theorizing.  
Although it’s probably true that we will never have theories that do entirely 
without any ad hoc assumptions, good science tries to minimize them. As T.S. Kuhn and 
many other have pointed out, for example, many celestial phenomena that appeared to be 
coincidences to Ptolemaic astronomers, who tried to accommodate them by fiat, were later 
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shown to follow from the basic structure of the Copernican system. Similarly, whereas the 
equivalence of gravitational mass and inertial mass in Newtonian physics is entirely 
accidental, it follows from the geometry of spacetime in Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity. All this constitutes progress in our understanding of the world. Hossenfelder 
knows herself that the facts alone are not enough to constrain theory choice: “Rather than 
falsifying theories, therefore, we “implausify” them: a continuously adapted theory 
becomes increasingly difficult and arcane—not to say ugly—and eventually practitioners 
lose interest” (40). Yet still one leaves with the impression that Hossenfelder believes that 
somehow physics would be helped if it just were to stick to the facts. 
There is much to like about Hossenfelder’s book. Hossenfelder is not only great at 
explaining difficult and abstract concepts and theories, but her writing is also highly 
entertaining. For example, expressing her frustration with the idea that the lack of 
evidence for supersymmetry at the LHC is interpreted by some as evidence for the 
multiverse, she says: “Theoretical physicists used to explain what was observed. Now 
they try to explain why they can’t explain what was not observed.” (108) During her visit 
of Steven Weinberg, she notes that his office is “half the size of mine, an observation that 
vaporizes what little ambition I ever had to win a Nobel Prize” (96). And with a good 
portion of self-irony, she remarks at one point: “Maybe I’m just here to find an excuse for 
leaving academia because I’m disillusioned, unable to stay motivated through all the null 
results [at the LHC]. And what an amazing excuse I have come up with—blaming a 
scientific community for misusing the scientific method” (81). Whether Hossenfelder’s 
“excuse” is actually correct, remains to be seen. But what is clear, I think, is that 
Hossenfelder with this book (and in her other writings) has made a valuable contribution 
to methodological debates in physics and in science general. You may not agree with her, 
but Hossenfelder is forcing physicists to think harder about their own theory-choice 
criteria. It also invites philosophers of science to cast a more critical eye on what many still 
regard the model science. This can only be a good thing.   
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